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Abstract
The generally accepted aim of doing business 
is to maximize the business value. The value of a 
business strongly depends on its ability to gene-
rate future cash flow for its owners. A necessary 
condition is that the business remains financially 
viable or in other words, the business should 
meet the assumption of going concern principle. 
Verifying such an assumption, however, remains 
an issue. We suggest that this could be indirectly 
verified as an absence of threat of imminent fi-
nancial distress. For this purpose, we analysed 
a set of cash flow and profit based ratios along 
with a set of other ratios with a potential influen-
ce on the business value. In terms of sample we 
focus on Czech manufacturing SMEs that were 
selected, due to their specific features resulting 
from the financial constraints. The F-test and t-
test were employed as a method of identifying the 
typical signs of risk of financial distress or rather 
obstacles in accepting the going concern princi-
ple. We found that only four of the analysed ratios 
could serve effectively for this purpose. The best 
results were achieved when employing ratios des-
cribing the operational cash flow or short-term 
debt, where the gap between viable business and 
those with limited prospects is the widest.
Keywords: cash flow; going concern; busi-
ness default
1. INTRODUCTION
According to the neoclassical theory 
of economics, the aim of doing business 
is to maximize the business value (see 
Damodaran, 2010; Brigham, Ehrhardt, 
2010; McKinsey, Koller, Goedhart, 
Wessels, 2005). This generally accepted 
idea has found its reflection in the con-
cept of “value-based management” (fur-
ther referred to as VBM). Knight (1998) 
defines the VBM “as an approach, which 
contributes to connecting the corporate 
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strategy, performance measurement and 
other activities contributing the maximiza-
tion of the business value” (see also Karas, 
Režňáková, 2017). Similar definition could 
be found in Koller (1994) who describes 
VBM as a connection between thought con-
tributing to increasing the business value 
and the corporate performance management 
systems.  Frigo (2002) understands the 
VBM as “a tool of strategical performance 
measurement, which encourages the corpo-
rate management to focus on internal per-
formance and by that support the business 
value creation”.
Fourie (2010) summarizes the key fea-
tures, distinguishing the VBM from other 
managerial approaches:
1. The aim of the value-based manage-
ment is to contribute to the business 
value.
2. Value-based management identifies the 
so-called value drivers of the business. 
3. VBM connects performance measuring 
and goal setting and it encourages the 
business value creation.
4. VBM combines decision-making and 
planning of value creating activities. 
According to Pohl (2017,) the objective 
of value-based management is “to max-
imise a company’s value. To achieve this, 
every management decision must aim to 
increase this value. This is the ultimate de-
cision criterion that governs whether po-
tential investments are realised, and if so, 
in which order of priority.” To calculate a 
company’s value for purposes of value-
based management, the following formula 
is used (Pohl, 2017):
,
where: CV - company’s value; T - time ho-
rizon; CFt - cash flow to equity at time t; k - 
cost of capital; TVT - terminal value at time T.
For a practical application of VBM, it is 
vital to identify the variables, which affect 
the cash flow to equity in the long term, or 
rather which affect the company’s value ei-
ther positively or negatively. Such variables 
are referred to as value drivers. Rappaport 
(1998), Copeland, Koller, Murrin (2005), 
Scarlett (2001) and Akalu (2002) define 
value drivers as “any variable affecting the 
value of a business”. A similar view could 
be found in Koller, Goedhart and Wessels 
(2010), according to whom the value drivers 
are any activities, which affect the business 
performance (both in long-term and short-
term horizon) and by that, affect the value of 
the business. Finally, Woodcock (1992) de-
scribes value drivers as “any internal or ex-
ternal mechanisms, which are able to create 
or destroy the value of the business”.
There is abundant research on value 
creating drivers. For example, Hall (2002) 
investigated the importance of given value 
drivers. As a result of his research, the fol-
lowing ranking of the value drivers is ob-
tained (in order of their importance):
1. Return On Capital Employed (ROCE),
2. Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC),
3. Short-term liabilities divided by 
Capital Employed,
4. Debt ratio (total liabilities divided by 
Capital Employed),
5. Net Operating Profit Before Taxes 
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Needles, Frigo and Powers (2004) ex-
plore the relationship between corporate 
strategy and corporate financial perfor-
mance. According to their results, com-
panies usually focus on indicators as total 
assets turnover, profit margin, debt-equity 
ratio and the ratio of operating cash flow 
and Earnings After Taxes (EAT). Under the 
concept of VBM, it is necessary to measure 
the value and, consequently, to focus on the 
identification of the key value drivers and 
affect them to achieve the aims of the own-
ers or reditors. In both theory and practice, 
the model of Discounted Free Cash Flow 
(further referred to as FCF model) is most 
often employed for this purpose. The vital 
assumption of the FCF model application 
is meeting the going concern principle. In 
practice, this means that for the company 
to achieve its goal, it is necessary to fulfil 
the conditions for long-term growth. On 
the one hand, the company has to meet the 
customers’ needs and constantly innovate 
its products and invest into technologies, 
while on the other hand, the financial sta-
bility of the business has to remain undis-
turbed, i.e. the solvency of the company has 
to be ensured and the risk, resulting from 
the high level of debt financing, should be 
minimized. 
However, there is a practical question 
of how this assumption should be verified. 
Given that a company is considered to be 
“operational”, if it is not directly threatened 
by bankruptcy, for this purpose, we suggest 
employing the bankruptcy prediction mod-
els, using the financial ratios. Moreover, 
as the value of a company is given by the 
FCF model, we assume that the cash flow-
based indicators (such as Debt/operating 
cash flow), might be especially useful for 
this purpose. This is the reason why we fo-
cused on the prediction ability of indicators 
with a potential impact on business value, 
i.e. indicators that could be regarded as the 
value drivers.
2. CAUSES OF CORPORATE 
BANKRUPTCY
According to Wu (2010), the internal 
enterprise causes of distress “may be seen 
in insufficient management skills, market-
ing, and inability to compete”. These fea-
tures are reflected in financial performance 
of business and recorded in the financial 
statements, which is why the accounting ra-
tios are a frequent source of information for 
assessing the financial situation of an enter-
prise. The companies undergoing business 
crises can be categorised as follows (Chen 
& Hsiao, 2008): 
• Companies lacking capital for running 
the business and starting having prob-
lems meeting their short-term monetary 
obligations (Deakin, 1972; Gilson, 
1989), which is detectable in the values 
of current liquidity, quick liquidity, ac-
counts receivable, cash flow, total asset 
turnover, and other factors. 
• Companies with a negative value of 
retained profit for two consecutive pe-
riods, or a negative growth for at least 
1 year. This is mainly evident from the 
following indicators: asset profitability, 
sales receipts, profits before and af-
ter taxes, and operating profit margin 
(Altman, 1983). 
• Companies whose shares on a public 
stock market exhibit an overall drop or 
are even excluded from trading.
Lin, Liang, Chen (2011) noticed that the 
early studies mostly relied on the financial 
ratios of profitability, liquidity and solven-
cy as indicators of financial difficulties, but 
the authors believe that further studies are 
needed, because there is research that has 
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indicated different ratios as being more re-
liable. Likewise, in different periods of the 
business cycle, we can identify different 
indicators of a firm’s probability of distress 
(Mensah, 1984; Grice & Dugan, 2001). 
According to Boratyńska (2016), there is a 
link between corporate distress (bankrupt-
cy) and the business cycle, but “there is no 
agreement on the channels by which bank-
ruptcies and the business cycle interact, nor 
on how to measure the link between them”.
3. INTERACTION BETWEEN 
CASH FLOW GENERATING 
ABILITY AND THREAT OF 
DEFAULT
The interaction between cash flow gen-
erating ability and the business default is es-
pecially significant in case of SMEs. SMEs 
are often regarded as more constrained in 
their financing options than large businesses. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, Maksimovic 
(2006) describe a business as a financially 
constrained, “if a windfall increase in sup-
ply of internal funds results in a higher level 
of investment spending”. A lot of research 
efforts have been dedicated to estimating fi-
nancial constraints of firms (see e.g. Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, Maksimovic, 2006; 
Fauceglia, 2015; Ullah, 2019; Erdogan, 
2018; McGuinness, Hogana, Powell, 2018). 
Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen (1988) showed 
that the investment decisions of financially 
constrained firms are more influenced by 
the availability of internal cash flows, when 
compared to the situation of unconstrained 
firms. Erdogan (2018) concluded that there 
is a relationship between a firm’s growth 
potential and the limited internal funds, 
which, in turn, hinders their ability to make 
investments, causing obstacles to the growth 
of SMEs as a consequence. On a sam-
ple of French manufacturing firms, Musso 
and Schiavo (2008) show that financial 
constraints present a significant factor, driv-
ing a firm’s survival, even after controlling 
for the effects of size, age, profitability and 
productive efficiency. McGuinness, Hogana, 
Powell (2018) examined whether the trade 
credit helped financially constrained SMEs 
survive the recent financial crisis, while 
above that highlights SMEs dependency 
on bank finance and their vulnerability to 
financing constraints (as noted by Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, Maksimovic., 2006 
or Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). McGuinness, 
Hogana, Powell (2018) further add that the 
SMEs survival can depend on extension of 
additional trade credit and/or relax payment 
terms by their unconstrained creditors. 
According to Jin, Luo, Wang (2018) 
businesses experiencing “higher financing 
constraints are more dependent on exter-
nal funds and thus more sensitive to fluc-
tuations in credit markets”. North, Baldock, 
Ekanem (2010) point out that the main 
source of external finance to SMEs are the 
commercial banks. 
From the above-mentioned perspective, 
the analysis of cash flow generating ability 
relatively to firm size (approximated by sales 
or total assets) or debt-repayment ability (ap-
proximated by various types of cash flow 
over liabilities) might gain an insight into the 
business ability of meeting the going concern 
principle. The aim of this paper is to analyse 
the potential of given financial ratios in pre-
dicting the corporate distress or rather as fac-
tors of destroying the business value of SMEs.
4. SAMPLE AND METHODS 
USED
The analysis was performed on a bal-
anced sample of 88 Czech SMEs, out of 
which 44 companies were defaulted (bank-
rupt) and 44 non-defaulted. Applying a 
29
Management, Vol. 25, 2020, No. 2, pp. 25-40
M. Karas, M.Režňáková: THE INDIRECT VERIFICATION OF THE GOING CONCERN...
balanced sample could be viewed as a tra-
ditional approach in studies on corporate 
bankruptcy (see Beaver, 1966; Altman, 
1968) although there are also many stud-
ies that use samples, with the proportion 
similar to the one in population (see for 
example Brezigar-Masten, Masten, 2012). 
The analysed companies were operating 
in the branch of manufacturing (NACE 2 
section C). The data were obtained from 
AMADEUS (Analysis Major Database for 
European Sources). The last report on de-
faulted companies dates to the period be-
tween 2013 and 2018. The reason for fo-
cusing on SMEs is their vulnerability in 
periods of economic recession, which is 
more strongly pronounced than in large 
or multinational companies (see Jin, Luo, 
Wang, 2018).
The significance of variables was tested 
by a two sample t-test, with equal or rather 
unequal variances. The test procedure can 
be described in the following manner. Let 
us suppose that we have two independent 
random samples (X1,…, Xn) from distribu-
tion N(μ1;σ
2), or rather (Y1,…, Ym) from dis-
tribution N(μ2;σ
2). Let’s further assume that 
0>;2;2 2σ≥≥ mn .The t-test assesses a 
null hypothesis, that the difference between 
the means of both groups (μ1, μ2) is equal to 
some constant (Δ), usually to zero (Δ=0), 
i.e.
∆=− 210 : µµH  (1)
against the alternative hypothesis:
∆≠− 211 : µµH   (2)
The test criterion, under assumption of 
equal variances can be expressed by the fol-
lowing form:

















where: 22 ,,, yx SSYX  are characteristics of 
the two random samples. 
The test criterion, under assumption of 
unequal variances can be expressed by the 
following form:































































5. RATIOS SELECTED FOR 
ANALYSIS
The following set of ratios was collected 
by reviewing the literature on bankruptcy 
prediction or value drivers. 
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Table 1. Indicators used for analysis
Shortcut Description Source
CFO/CL Operating cash flow1/current liabilities Bhandari, Johnson-Snyder (2018), Thomas Ng, 
Wong, Zhang (2011)
CFO/INT (Operating cash flow1 + interest 
expenses + tax)/interest expenses
Bhandari, Johnson-Snyder (2018)
CFO/S Operating cash flow1/sales Bhandari, Johnson-Snyder (2018), Thomas Ng, 
Wong, Zhang (2011)
CFO/TA Operating cash flow1/total assets Bhandari and Johnson-Snyder (2018), Thomas Ng, 
Wong, Zhang (2011)
EBIT/CFO EBIT/operating cash flow1 Bhandari, Johnson-Snyder (2018)
CFO/TL Operating cash flow1/total liabilities Thomas Ng, Wong, Zhang (2011)
CF/S Cash flow2/sales Beaver (1966)
CF/TA Cash flow2/total assets Beaver (1966)
CF/TL Cash flow2/total liabilities Beaver (1966)
CF/NW Cash flow2/net worth Beaver (1966)
CF/CL Cash flow2/current liabilities Brezigar-Masten, Masten (2012)
TL/TA Total liabilities/total assets Brezigar-Masten, Masten (2012); Wang, Ma (2011), 
Altman, Sabato (2006)
TA/CL Total assets/ current liabilities Brezigar-Masten, Masten (2012)
OR/OC Operating revenue/operating cost Brezigar-Masten, Masten (2012)
EAT/TA Net profit/total assets Brezigar-Masten, Masten (2012); Cheng, Chen, Fu 
(2006), Grunert, Norden, Weber (2004), Lin, (2009), 
Wang, Lee (2008).
EBIT/TA Operating profit/total assets Alaminos, Del Castillo and  Fernandez (2016); 
Altman (1968); Li, Sun (2009); Psillaki, Tsolas, 
Margaritis (2009); Shumway (2001)
CA/TA Current assets/Total assets Alaminos, Del Castillo and  Fernandez (2016)
NWC/TA Net Working Capital/Total assets Alaminos, Del Castillo and  Fernandez (2016); 
Altman (1968); Ding, Song, Zen(2008), Psillaki, 
Tsolas, Margaritis (2009), Wu, Gaunt, Grey (2010)
ROCE EBIT/capital employed3 Hall (2002)
CL/CE Current liabilities/capital employed3 Hall (2002)
TL/CE Current liabilities/capital employed3 Hall (2002)
dNWC/TA Change of net working capital/total 
assets4
Minchington, Francis (2000); Rappaport (1998)
dNWC/S Change of net working capital/sales4 Minchington, Francis (2000); Rappaport (1998)
dFA/TA Change of fixed assets/total assets4 Minchington, Francis (2000); Rappaport (1998)
dFA/S Change of fixed assets/ sales4 Minchington, Francis (2000); Rappaport (1998)
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Source: Alaminos, Del Castillo,Fernandez 
(2016); Altman, Sabato (2006); Altman (1968); 
Beaver (1966); Bhandari, Johnson-Snyder 
(2018); Brezigar-Masten, Masten (2012); 
Masten (2012); Cheng, Chen, Fu (2006), 
Grunert, Norden, Weber (2004); Lin (2009), 
Wang, Lee (2008);, Lin (2009); Wu, Gaunt, 
Grey (2010); Thomas Ng, Wong, Zhang (2011); 
Hall (2002); Minchington, Francis, (2000); 
Rappaport, (1998)
Note: 1Operating cash flow was calculated as 
EBIT + depreciation – [working capital (t)-
working capital (t-1)]; 2Cash flow = Net profit + 
depreciation; 3long-term liabilities + sharehold-
er funds; 4The indicators is modified, in contrary 
to mentioned literature, to the form of ratio (i.e. 
divided by total assets or rather sales)
Included ratios are seen as being related 
to the value of the company, viewed from 
the perspective of FCF method, i.e. the ma-
jority of analysed ratios are cash flow- or 
profit-based (applying either cash flow or 
operating cash flow or net profit or operat-
ing profit), as the profit or rather cash flow 
generating ability has a direct influence on 
free cash flow and, thus, the business value. 
Other indicators describe the capital struc-
ture (in terms of indebtedness or capital 
intensity ratios) or describe the asset struc-
ture or investments (either in working capi-
tal or fixed assets).
6. RESULTS
The descriptive statistics of the con-
tinuous variables of the models under 
investigation are listed in the Table 2. 
Several variables clearly exhibit an out-
lier’s value, which is evident from the 
comparison of mean value and the median 
value. This situation is especially obvious 
in case of Cash flow coverage of interest 
(CFO+INT+TAX)/INT), while this situa-
tion is more obvious in case of non-failed 
companies, than in case of the failed com-
panies. Among the specifics of failed com-
panies in the sample, we can find features 
like negative operating cash flow (see indi-
cators: CFO/CL, CFO/S or CF/CL), nega-
tive Operating profit (see EBIT/TA) or a 
high level of issued debt (TL/TA indicator, 
which is a ratio of total liabilities and total 
assets). About 50% of the failed compa-
nies, financed at least 84% of their assets by 
debt, while in case of the non-failed compa-
nies, it was only 50% of assets.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample
Variable status Valid N Mean Median Min. Max. Std.Dev.
(CFO+INT 
+TAX)/INT
Non-Failed 37 1207.63 26.34 -116.759 35028.00 5760.188
Failed 10 21.60 7.57 0.31 119.338 36.352
CFO/CL
Non-Failed 42 0.49 0.44 -0.651 1.55 0.519
Failed 16 -0.08 0.08 -3.60 0.935 1.024
CFO/SALES
Non-Failed 43 0.08 0.08 -0.488 0.28 0.128
Failed 16 -3.00 0.03 -48.70 0.745 12.192
CFO/TA
Non-Failed 43 0.10 0.11 -0.463 0.43 0.148
Failed 16 30.73 0.06 -6.68 498.286 124.693
EBIT/CFO
Non-Failed 43 0.48 0.48 -1.911 3.36 0.928
Failed 16 -1.12 0.15 -12.17 1.102 3.396
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CF/CL
Non-Failed 42 0.41 0.31 -0.454 1.41 0.364
Failed 18 -1.04 0.01 -15.34 0.285 3.673
TA/CL
Non-Failed 42 3.96 3.25 1.050 12.38 2.487
Failed 27 1.56 1.34 0.00 3.667 1.020
OR/OC
Non-Failed 43 1.05 1.04 0.648 1.15 0.079
Failed 26 0.91 1.01 0.02 1.123 0.251
TL/TA
Non-Failed 43 0.47 0.50 0.084 0.98 0.250
Failed 27 66.84 0.84 0.27 1648.857 317.077
NWC/TA
Non-Failed 43 0.32 0.34 -0.058 0.81 0.173
Failed 27 -3.63 0.12 -100.99 0.757 19.461
EBIT/TA
Non-Failed 43 0.07 0.07 -0.300 0.29 0.092
Failed 27 -224.86 0.00 -6063.00 0.324 1166.764
CA/TA
Non-Failed 43 0.62 0.62 0.221 0.94 0.202
Failed 27 0.66 0.72 0.00 1.000 0.304
TL/CE
Non-Failed 43 1.39372 0.746565 0.0919 20.10222 3.16675
Failed 27 6.926 1.156337 -8.73 98.36905 21.722
ROCE
Non-Failed 43 -0.02166 0.099319 -6.3233 0.54269 0.99278
Failed 27 0.87 0.095445 -2.04 11.39968 2.667
CFO /TL
Non-Failed 43 0.344642 0.249879 -0.5758 1.53015 0.48383
Failed 16 0.018 0.074998 -0.9 0.58413 0.404
CFO/EBIT
Non-Failed 43 -0.32481 1.37294 -70.6061 14.343 12.90439
Failed 16 -1.533 1.521279 -107.41 43.75 30.178
dNWC/TA
Non-Failed 43 0.022106 0.019847 -0.3479 0.57116 0.1486
Failed 23 -375.41 0 -8634.57 0.75656 1800.434
dNWC/S
Non-Failed 43 0.004163 0.012866 -0.2921 0.32134 0.1035
Failed 22 -0.559 -0.00411 -12.91 0.85508 2.769
dFA/TA
Non-Failed 43 0.015068 0.000536 -0.1071 0.23832 0.0659
Failed 23 -180.536 0 -4154.29 0.59613 866.247
dFA/S
Non-Failed 43 0.007464 0.000273 -0.1183 0.17369 0.05119
Failed 22 -0.021 0.001495 -6.21 4.29545 1.666
CL/CE
Non-Failed 43 1.183837 0.441091 0 20.10222 3.15277
Failed 27 7.283 0.798122 -6.16 98.36905 21.488
CF/TL
Non-Failed 42 0.23533 0.248146 -2.5445 1.25289 0.58196
Failed 15 -0.836 0.001082 -14.04 1.48299 3.685
CF/TA
Non-Failed 42 0.112535 0.097151 -0.5921 0.55774 0.17737
Failed 15 -21.533 0.001561 -306.43 1.31104 78.894
CF/S
Non-Failed 42 0.079418 0.076853 -0.2549 0.33234 0.08793
Failed 14 -0.05 0.008337 -1.94 1.48178 0.694
33
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CF/NW
Non-Failed 42 0.983253 0.158793 -0.7716 28.87624 4.42766
Failed 15 -10.649 0.032439 -163.96 11.30705 42.576
Source: Own calculation, based on the Amadeus database
For testing the usefulness of the indica-
tors for predicting the corporate distress, 
we employed Student’s t-test. According 
to the results of F-test the variance in both 
samples is different, thus the test criterion, 
under assumption of unequal variances has 
to be interpreted (see t separ.; and corre-
sponding p-value marked as p(2)).
Table 3. F-test and t-test results
Variable t-value df p-val.(1) t separ. df p-val.(2) F-ratio p-val.(3)
(CFO+INT+ 
TAX )/ INT -0.646 45 0.521624 -1.252 36.011 0.218511 25108 0.000000
CFO/CL** -2.788 56 0.007240 -2.111 18.019 0.048973 4 0.000548
CFO/SALES -1.682 57 0.098010 -1.011 15.001 0.328076 9109 0.000000
CFO/TA 1.635 57 0.107514 0.983 15.000 0.341388 706916 0.000000
EBIT/CFO -2.846 57 0.006143 -1.855 15.841 0.082336 13 0.000000
CF/CL -2.558 58 0.013163 -1.671 17.143 0.112829 102 0.000000
TA/CL*** -4.749 67 0.000011 -5.563 58.905 0.000001 6 0.000009
OR/OC** -3.390 67 0.001177 -2.751 28.016 0.010291 10 0.000000
TL/TA 1.379 68 0.172547 1.088 26.000 0.286745 1613080 0.000000
NWC/TA -1.335 68 0.186436 -1.053 26.003 0.302017 12702 0.000000
EBIT/TA -1.270 68 0.208513 -1.002 26.000 0.325702 159589462 0.000000
CA/TA 0.735 68 0.464917 0.671 40.442 0.505848 2 0.017326
CFO/EBIT -0.21671 57 0.829210 -0.15494 17.08225 0.878687 5 0.000013
CFO/TL** -2.39970 57 0.019699 -2.60667 31.99527 0.013769 1 0.457325
CF/S -1.20161 54 0.234759 -0.69596 13.13953 0.498581 62 0.000000
CF/TA -1.80786 55 0.076098 -1.06258 14.00005 0.305957 197848 0.000000
CF/NW -1.77249 55 0.081851 -1.05612 14.10829 0.308663 92 0.000000
CF/TL -1.84967 55 0.069736 -1.12117 14.25012 0.280753 40 0.000000
dNWC/TA -1.37676 64 0.173383 -1.00004 22.00000 0.328164 146800129 0.000000
dFA/TA -1.37614 64 0.173574 -0.99959 22.00000 0.328377 172798057 0.000000
dNWC/S -1.34210 63 0.184380 -0.95367 21.03002 0.351085 716 0.000000
dFA/S -0.11188 63 0.911274 -0.07947 21.02030 0.937408 1059 0.000000
ROCE 1.98958 68 0.050660 1.66552 30.57664 0.106024 7 0.000000
CL/CE 1.83785 68 0.070453 1.46509 26.70461 0.154572 46 0.000000
TL/CE 1.64939 68 0.103680 1.31469 26.69565 0.199799 47 0.000000
Note: *significant at 5% level, **significant at 1% level, p-val.(1) – p-value of the test statistics under 
assumption of equal variances, p-val. (2) - p-value of the test statistics under assumption of unequal 
variances, p-val. (3) – p-value of the F-test.  Source: Own calculation based on the Amadeus database
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For a practical implication of the gained 
results, a deeper insight into values of the 
significant ratios is needed. For that pur-
pose, we employ rank statistics. 
Table 4. Rank statistics of the significant ratios
Variable Group Lower quartile Median Upper quartile
CFO/TL
Failed -0.0501 0.0750 0.2487
Non-failed -0.1158 0.2499 0.5662
OR/OC
Failed -0.9273 1.0051 1.0292
Non-failed -1.0229 1.0419 1.0976
TA/CL
Failed -0.8377 1.3399 2.2529
Non-failed -2.1902 3.2480 5.6044
CFO/CL
Failed -0.0568 0.0787 0.3757
Non-failed -0.1442 0.4416 0.9156
Source: Own calculation based on the Amadeus database
We use the quartiles for describing the 
differences between healthy companies (non-
failed) and financially distressed companies 
(failed). As demonstrated by the descriptive 
statistics (see Table 4), these two groups are 
not completely separate. Due to such over-
lap, there is, still, at least a minimum chance 
of risk of financial distress. For a practical as-
sessment of the acceptance of going concern 
assumption, we suggest to treat the following 
range of values as recommendable for accept-
ing the assumption. The minimum acceptable 
value would be represented by the upper quar-
tile of failed companies, while the upper quar-
tile of non-failed companies would serve as 
recommended or target value - the higher this 
value, the more acceptable the situation.
Table 5. Minimum acceptable and target values 






Source: Own calculation based on the Amadeus 
database
For business to remain viable, it is im-
portant to be able to generate operating cash 
flow, which covers at least 24.87% of the 
total debt, or rather preferably 37.57% of its 
short-term debts. Moreover, the total assets 
should cover the value of short-term debts 
at least 2.25 times (equivalent to maximum 
of 44% short-term indebtedness) or, rather, 
favourably 5.6 times (equivalent to maxi-
mum of 17.8% short-term indebtedness). 
Furthermore, the operation revenue should 
exceed the operation costs at least by 
2.92%, while favourably by at least 9.76%).
7. DISCUSSION
The aim of this paper is to analyse the 
potential of financial ratios in predicting the 
corporate distress, considering them as fac-
tors with potential to destroy the business 
value. The set of potential ratios was col-
lected by the review of current literature on 
corporate distress prediction and literature 
on business valuation.
According to the t-test, most signifi-
cant ratios exploit the value of current li-
abilities, one in the relationship to operat-
ing cash flow (see CFO/CL or CFO/TL) 
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or in relationship to total assets value (TA/
CL). It is important that similar ratios were 
also considered (see CF/CL or CF/TL). The 
only difference was employing cash flow 
(i.e. net profit + depreciation), instead of 
operating cash flow (i.e. EBIT + deprecia-
tion – change of net working capital). The 
financial expenses, taxes and changes of net 
working capital seem to play an important 
role in predicting bankruptcy, while their 
relationship to free cash flow and, thus, the 
business value is known (see Hall, 2002).
As for the cash flow generating abil-
ity, for the financially healthy SMEs in our 
sample, it is typical that the operating cash 
flow is about 49.5% of its current liabilities 
(the median value), while for failing SMEs, 
the typical value is only 8%. In case of to-
tal liabilities, the operating cash flow for the 
financially healthy SMEs is about 24.98%, 
while in case of failing ones only 7.49%. 
The poor ability of failing companies in 
generating cash flow to cover their debts is 
in line with previous research (for example 
Beaver, 1966). Beaver (1966) pointed out 
the ratio cash flow to total debt as the most 
significant ratio of his study (among 30 oth-
ers ratios). This ration, when employed in 
our study (see CF/TL), was outperformed 
by the CFO/TL or CFO/CL ratio.
Further focus on failing SMEs charac-
teristics have revealed that about 50% of 
the failed companies financed at least 84% 
of their assets by debt, while in case of the 
healthy companies, it was only 50% of as-
sets. This suggests that the capital struc-
ture of failed companies was inappropriate, 
which finally led to the solvency problems, 
and, consequently, to their bankruptcy. 
A further support for this claim could be 
found, when comparing the data on failed 
and non-failed companies in the sample. At 
one hand, a difference in the asset structure 
(see CA/TA indicator) between failed and 
non-failed companies was non-significant, 
but on the other hand, the difference in the 
capital structure (see the TA/CL indicator) 
was significant, which suggests that the 
failed companies were not able to match the 
capital and the assets structure. This is in 
line with other authors’ results, who consid-
er the higher proportion of debt in the com-
pany’s capital structure as an impending in-
dication of financial distress (see Zavgren, 
1985). The importance and stability of total 
debt over assets ratio, based on a large sam-
ple of the four countries of Visegrad group, 
was also confirmed by Kliestik, Vrbka and 
Rowland (2018).
The significance of indebtedness in dis-
tress prediction has been summarised by 
Psillaki, Tsolas, Margaritis (2009), who ar-
gue that the total amount of debt “is regu-
larly used as an indicator of a company’s 
ability to meet its long-term debt obliga-
tions and remain solvent.” The severity of 
the debt problem is usually assessed in re-
lation to the value of assets, or as the total 
debt, i.e. the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets (TL/TA). This definition of indebt-
edness became part of a series of studies 
and models (Beaver, 1966; Deakin, 1972; 
Ohlson, 1980; Ding, Song, Zen, 2008; 
Psillaki, Tsolas, Margaritis, 2009; Shin, 
Han, 2001; Altman, 1983; Zavgren, 1985; 
Wang, Ma, 2011; Altman, Sabato, 2006; 
Carling, Jacobson, Linde, Roszbach, 2007). 
Although the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets (TL/TA) was under investigation in 
this study, the results do not exhibit signifi-
cant values. It is worth saying that our study 
focuses on SMEs. Many traditional sources 
of long-term finance are more accessible 
to larger, rather than small businesses (see 
Atrill, 2003, p. 212). Thus, the SMEs are 
more vulnerable in the case of an economic 
recession than large or multinational com-
panies (see Jin, Luo, Wang, 2018).
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Focusing on the cash flow ratios, the 
only significant ratio based on cash flow 
was the ratio of cash flow to current li-
abilities. In the pioneer work of Beaver 
(1966), who analysed 30 financial ratios 
and their ability to indicate the risk of finan-
cial distress, the ratio of cash flow to total 
debts was found to be most useful for this 
purpose. 
The usefulness of cash flow based ra-
tio was a subject to research of Henerby 
(1996), according to whom, it could serve 
as an early warning indicator (at least three 
years, prior to failure), but is inappropri-
ate for a short-term prognosis (one year, 
prior to failure). Our study also suggests 
that cash flow indicators are especially use-
ful in predicting financial distress or threat 
to the long term perspective of the business 
– especially those, based on operating cash 
flow.
For a practical assessment of the ac-
ceptance of going concern assumption, we 
suggested to use the rank statistics of sig-
nificant ratios as a suitable measure for as-
sessing the going concern principle. To 
minimize the overlap of values, we suggest 
to treat the upper quartile of failed compa-
nies’ values as the minimum acceptable val-
ue, while the upper quartile for non-failed 
companies would serve as recommended or 
target value. 
8. CONCLUSION
The aim of the paper was to analyse the 
ability of financial ratios to reflect the ob-
stacles in long-term business perspective, or 
rather, the obstacle in accepting the going 
concern principle. When valuing a business, 
the principle of going concern is often em-
ployed, however, the question is how this 
assumption should be proved. We argue that 
a company’s inability to face such obstacles 
in long-term business perspective could re-
sult in corporate bankruptcy and by evalu-
ating the threat of bankruptcy, the assump-
tion of going concern could be indirectly 
verified.
It was proved that such a threat is re-
flected in financial statements and by ana-
lysing financial ratios, such a threat could 
be evaluated. Our research focuses on 
SMEs that are often financially constrained, 
i.e. they have limited access to long-term 
sources of finance, compared to large com-
panies. Because of that, their capital struc-
ture is different and the typical signs of 
bankruptcy threat could differ.
The results show that the majority of fi-
nancial ratios under analysis did not exhibit 
sufficient explanatory power, in terms of 
reflecting the risk of bankruptcy or, rather, 
threatening the long-term prosperity of the 
business. In other words, verifying the as-
sumption of going concern principle in case 
of SMEs, cannot be effectively done by fo-
cusing on the commonly employed finan-
cial ratios. 
According to our data, the signs of poor 
future prospects of the SMEs are poor cash 
generating ability, especially in relation to 
its debts, as well as a high level of debt (es-
pecially short-term debts) and the level of 
operation cost.
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INDIREKTNA VERIFIKACIJA PRETPOSTAVKE 
TRAJNOG POSLOVANJA KORIŠTENJEM ANALIZE 
STEČAJNE PRIJETNJE
Sažetak 
Opće prihvaćeni cilj poslovanja je maksimiziranje vrijednosti poduzeća, koja značajno ovisi o spo-
sobnosti za stvaranje budućih tijekova novca za vlasnike. Pritom se podrazumijeva uvjet financijske 
održivosti poduzeća, odnosno ispunjavanje pretpostavke trajnosti poslovanja. Ipak, verifikacija nave-
dene pretpostavke ostaje i dalje otvoreno pitanje. Smatramo da se isto može riješiti indirektnom verifi-
kacijom, koja podrazumijeva nepostojanje prijetnje bliske financijske krize. U tu smo svrhu analizirali 
skupinu pokazatelja, zasnovanih na novčanom tijeku i dobiti, zajedno sa skupinom drugih pokazatelja, 
s potencijalnim djelovanjem na vrijednost poduzeća. Koncentriramo se na uzorak malih i srednjih 
proizvodnih poduzeća u Češkoj, a koja su izabrana, s obzirom na specifična obilježja, povezana s 
financijskim ograničenjima. Za identifikaciju tipičnih znakova rizika financijskih poteškoća, odnosno 
nepoštovanja pretpostavke trajnosti poslovanja, koriste se F- i t-test. Za efikasno korištenje u navedene 
svrhe, pozitivno smo vrednovali samo četiri od analiziranih pokazatelja. Najbolji se rezultati dobivaju 
korištenjem indikatora, koji opisuju operativni novčani tijek ili kratkoročni dug, kod kojih se javljaju 
najveće razlike između održivih poduzeća i onih s ograničenim perspektivama.
Ključne riječi: gotovinski tijek, pretpostavka trajnog poslovanja, stečaj
industrial firms: A logistic analy-
sis. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, 12 (1), 19-45.
